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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction 
over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) . This 
is an appeal from orders in a civil matter, from the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, which were certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, jurisdiction is 
proper. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Gas-A-Mat Oil Corporation of Colorado 
The Court granted Defendant/Appellee's Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Plaintiffs/Appellants contend that the dual capacity 
doctrine supports the position that an employer may act in dual 
roles. In reviewing a court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6), the standard of review is that the Appellate 
Court must review the case in the light most favorable to the 
party whose complaint was dismissed. Since there are no findings 
of fact, the Appellate Court may substitute its judgment for that 
of the Trial Court. See Draper Bank & Trust Co. v. Lawson, 675 
P.2D 1174 (Utah 1983) and Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1989). 
B. State Defendants/Appellees: 
The issue presented is what duty is created on the 
part of a state agency to members of the public in general. The 
Court has indicated that a duty may be created either by a 
special relationship between the State and the victim or by a 
special relationship between the State and the third-party actor. 
The Appellants assert that the third-party actor was being 
supervised by the State Defendants/Appellees, thereby creating a 
duty to regulate foreseeable conduct against foreseeable (if not 
readily identifiable) persons. Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims 
against the State were denied on a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
therefore, the Court must review the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiffs/Appellants and determine if any 
material issues of fact exist. In that no findings of facts have 
been entered, the Appellate Court may substitute its judgment for 
that of the Trial Court in that these are questions of law. See 
Ferree. supra, Lawson, supra and Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. 
Nielson, 672 P.2D 746 (1983). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
There are no determinative statutes, rules or cases 
in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action was filed by the survivors of the 
decedent, Maurine Hunsaker against an employer, the Appellee Gas-
A-Mat Oil Corporation of Colorado (hereinafter "Gas-A-Mat") and 
against the State of Utah, Department of Corrections and its 
various representatives (hereinafter "State Defendants"). Mrs. 
Hunsaker was abducted and murdered by a parolee, Ralph L. 
Menzies. At the time Mrs. Hunsaker was abductedf she was 
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employed by Gas-A-Mat. Appellants contend that Gas-A-Mat was 
acting in a dual capacity in its employment of Maurine Hunsaker 
and as a provider of security for its station locations. 
On the night she was abducted, Mrs. Hunsaker was 
working at Gas-A-Mat's 3995 West 4700 South, Salt Lake County, 
Utah station. At that station, Gas-A-Mat had indicated, through 
the posting of signs, that security, "electronic surveillance", 
was being provided. This provision of security creates the dual 
capacity in which Gas-A-Mat was acting. While the Utah Supreme 
Court has not accepted the concept of dual capacity, it has not 
rejected it either. The Appellants contend that this fact 
situation is what is contemplated in the doctrine of duel 
capacity. 
While it is true that generally an employer has an 
obligation to provide a safe working environment, that duty 
doesn't usually extend to the providing of security from attacks 
by third parties. In this case, Gas-A-Mat stepped out if its 
role as employer and stepped into the role of a provider of 
security. The contemplation of a "safe working environment" is 
one where an employee would be safe from on-the-job accidents and 
other usual hazards of employment. Attacks by third parties are 
not generally considered to be hazards of employment, even at 
convenient stores/gas stations. 
In posting the premises as being under electronic 
surveillance, Gas-A-Mat created the appearance of a secured 
location. Maurine Hunsaker and the Appellants relied on Gas-A-
3 
Mat's representations that security was in fact being provided. 
Therefore, their reliance and subsequent actions on that reliance 
created the duty to protect Maurine Hunsaker from foreseeable 
harm. In that this site had been robbed on previous occasions, 
the actions taken by Mr. Menzies against Mrs. Hunsaker were 
clearly foreseeable on the part of Gas-A-Mat. Gas-A-Mat in its 
role as a provider of security failed to meet its duty of due 
care. 
Mr. Menzies was on parole at the time of Mrs. 
Hunsaker's death and Appellants also assert that the parole was 
negligently supervised by the State Defendants/Appellees (all 
State Defendants except the Board of Pardons). Appellants assert 
that, while on parole, Menzies committed numerous acts which were 
considered to be violations of parole and yet no incident reports 
or reports of parole violations were ever filed with the Board of 
Pardons. This is contradictory to the then existing policies and 
procedures promulgated by the Department of Corrections, Division 
of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Appellants also assert that the supervising parole 
officer, John Shepherd, failed to properly monitor the parole of 
the Defendant Menzies and failed to thoroughly investigate 
allegations of violations made against Menzies. This also is a 
violation of the policies and procedures of the Department of 
Corrections, Division of Adult Probation and Parole. 
Appellants assert that as a direct result of the 
State Defendants/Appellees' failure to properly supervise 
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Menzies' activities while on parole, he was able to abduct and 
murder the decedent, Maurine Hunsaker. Appellants assert that 
the State Defendants/Appellees, because of their relationship to 
the Defendant Menzies, had a duty to foreseeable, if not readily 
identifiable, members of the public to protect them from the 
actions of Ralph L. Menzies. The State Defendants/Appellees were 
aware of Menzies' long violent history, his prison records, 
including his juvenile record, and in all other ways were well 
acquainted with the danger this individual posed to society if 
not properly supervised. Even with this information, the State 
Defendants/Appellees failed to properly supervise the parole. 
Appellants also assert that the State 
Defendants/Appellees are not immune from action in this matter in 
that their actions were not discretionary. The Board of Pardons 
set specific conditions and terms of parole and it is the 
obligation and duty of Adult Probation and Parole to enforce the 
terms and conditions. Appellants allege that the enforcement of 
these terms and conditions is not discretionary, but is 
ministerial. In addition, complying with the policies set by 
Adult Probation and Parole, specifically those policies requiring 
incident reports and reports of possible parole violations, are 
not discretionary, but are ministerial in nature. Therefore, the 
failure on the part of the parole officer and his supervisors to 
file incident reports and reports of parole violations were 
ministerial acts and are not protected under the governmental 
immunity statutes. Appellants assert that these actions on the 
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part of the State Defendants/Appellees proximately caused the 
death of Maurine Hunsaker and therefore those Defendants are 
liable to the Appellants for damages. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Complaint in this matter was filed on or about 
June 16, 1987. Answers were filed by all Defendants and the case 
proceeded through discovery. In early 1988, a Motion to Dismiss 
was heard by the trial court as to the Defendant/Appellee Gas-A-
Mat Oil Corporation of Colorado. This Motion was brought under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the Motion 
was granted. At that time, Plaintiffs/Appellants made an oral 
motion for certification pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, but the trial court denied the motion. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants continued discovery as to the 
State Defendants/Appellees and, ultimately, Motions for Summary 
Judgment were filed by all parties, with the exception of Ralph 
L. Menzies. These motions were heard by the trial court and 
further memoranda was requested. Supplemental memorandums were 
filed and the matter was heard by the trial court. On or about 
April 5, 1991, the trial court ruled in favor of the State 
Defendants/Appellees and entered summary judgment against the 
Appellants. 
C. Disposition by Trial Court 
The Trial Court initially dismissed Plaintiff's 
claims against Appellee Gas-A-Mat in its Order of Dismissal dated 
February 1, 1988 (Attachment "A"). The issues as to the 
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remaining Defendants, with the exception of Ralph Leroy Menzies, 
were resolved by the trial court granting summary judgment, 
Minute Entry dated April 5, 1991 (Attachment "B"). An Order 
followed the Court's Minute Entry which was objected to by 
Appellants. An amended Order granting summary judgment was 
entered by the Court on or about May 15, 1991 (Attachment "C"). 
In that this Order did not dispose of all issues before the 
Court, an Order pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure was requested. Said Order, entering final judgment as 
to all Defendants/Appellees, with the exception of Ralph Leroy 
Menzies, was entered on May 29, 1991 (Attachment "D"). 
Subsequently, the Plaintiffs/Appellants sought and obtained an 
Order enlarging time to file a notice of appeal and said Order 
was entered June 27, 1991 (Attachment HE"). 
Plaintiffs/Appellants then commenced this Appeal by filing their 
Notice of Appeal on July 26, 1991 (Attachment "F"). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
I. 
GAS-A-MAT 
a. Defendant Menzies was released from 
incarceration on the 9th day of October, 1984 under certain terms 
and conditions of parole (Plaintiffs' Complaint, hereinafter 
"PC", f26, Appellants' Addendum, hereinafter "Applts' Add.", 
P. 75). 
b. The decedent Maurine Hunsaker was employed by 
Defendant/Appellee Gas-A-Mat Oil Corp of Colorado (hereinafter 
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"Gas-A-Mat") on the 22d day of February, 1986. She was employed 
by Gas-A-Mat as a cashier at its station located at 3995 West 
4700 South, Salt Lake County, Utah (PC fl 35, Applts' Add. p. 76). 
c. Decedent's duties consisted primarily of 
monitoring the customers at said Gas-A-Mat location and receiving 
payment from them for products purchased (PC U36, Applts' 
Add. pp. 76-77). 
d. At all times material hereto, Defendant/Appellee 
Gas-A-Mat served in two capacities in its retail gasoline 
operation (PC 1137, Applts' Add. p. 77). 
e. Defendant/Appellee Gas-A-Mat served as a 
retailer of gasoline products and, in that capacity, was the 
employer of Maurine Hunsaker (PC U 38, Applts' Add. p. 77). 
f. As the employer of Maurine Hunsaker, Gas-A-Mat 
had duties and obligations attendant between all employers and 
employees (PC f 39, Applts' Add. p. 77). 
g. These duties included, but were not limited to: 
payments for services rendered, collection of withholding and 
social security taxes, provision of a safe work place (with safe 
meaning safe from industrial accidents) and other obligations and 
requirements. Defendant/Appellee Gas-A-Mat, as Maurine 
Hunsaker's employer, generally fulfilled these duties and 
obligations (PC fl40, Applts' Add. p. 77). 
h. However, Gas-A-Mat undertook further obligations 
and began serving in an additional capacity other than that of 
retail gasoline sales (PC U41, Applts' Add. p. 77). 
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i. Gas-A-Mat undertook to provide security from 
violent acts or theft by third persons (PC H42, Applts' Add. p. 
77). 
j. These acts consisted of the provision of 
cashiers booths, signs alerting individuals that the premises 
were secured (although they were not) and other measures to 
protect the security of any individual entering onto the premises 
including employees of Gas-A-Mat's retail gasoline sales 
operation. (For the purposes of distinguishing the two 
capacities, the retail sales will be referred to as "Gas-A-Mat 
Sales" and the security operation will be referred to as 
"Gas-A-Mat Security") (PC f43, Applts' Add. p. 77-78). 
k. Gas-A-Mat Security was aware that the Gas-A-Mat 
Sales installations were particularly subject to armed theft (PC 
144, Applts' Add. p. 78). 
1. This was due to the nature of their business 
and the fact that convenience outlets of all kinds are noted as 
high risk operations (PC H45, Applts' Add. p. 78). 
m. The retail sales location at which Maurine 
Hunsaker had been employed had been robbed at least twice 
previous to the abduction of Maurine Hunsaker on February 22d, 
1986 (PC 146, Applts' Add. p. 78). 
n. Due to the high risk nature of the Gas-A-Mat 
Sales operation, Gas-A-Mat Security had a duty to inform Gas-A-
Mat Sales as to improvements to be made in security at said 
installation (PC H47, Applts' Add. p. 78). 
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o. Some of these recommendations should have been 
a locked, bullet-resistant cashier's booth where employees could 
be protected from armed assailants, employee training to prevent 
situations whereby innocent third parties could be injured as a 
result of an attempted theft or robbery, an adequate alarm system 
whereby an employee could signal the local authorities or Gas-A-
Mat Security to assist them in a robbery or theft situation, 
reasonable shift work and times so that employees would not be 
left alone for long periods of time, and adequate surveillance on 
a random basis either by Gas-A-Mat Security or local police 
officers (PC f48, Applts' Add. p. 78-79). 
p. Gas-A-Mat Security failed to provide these 
recommendations to Gas-A-Mat Sales and as a result, none of said 
recommendations were implemented (PC U49, Applts' Add. p. 79). 
q. The design of the cashier's booth was faulty 
in that it required an employee to leave the booth to obtain 
payment from the customers. It also had no bullet resistant 
features (PC 1150, Applts' Add. p. 79). 
r. Gas-A-Mat Security had a duty and an 
obligation to inform Gas-A-Mat Sales of the deficiencies in its 
operation (PC 151, Applts' Add. p. 79). 
s. Gas-A-Mat Security failed to so inform Gas-A-
Mat Sales and, as a proximate result, the decedent Maurine 
Hunsaker was abducted by the defendant Ralph Leroy Menzies and 
John Does I-V on the 22d day of February, 1986 (PC 1152, Applts' 




t. Ralph Menzies was paroled on October 9, 1984 
and executed a Standard Parole Agreement with the terms and 
conditions normally contained in said agreements. In addition, 
special conditions were placed upon Menzies' parole, to wit: He 
was to maintain mental health counseling and he was to complete a 
halfway house program (Applts' Add. p. 27). 
u. The Utah State Board of Pardons amended the 
parole agreement and deleted the requirement of the halfway 
house, but reaffirmed the portion requiring Menzies to maintain 
mental health counseling (Applts' Add., pp. 3, 4, 28). 
v. While on parole, Menzies received no mental 
health counseling other than two visits with Dr. Brockbank and no 
attempt was made to have the condition of maintaining mental 
health counseling removed from Menzies parole agreement (Applts' 
Add., p. 37). 
w. On or about December 17, 1984, Shepherd 
received a report that Menzies was threatening an individual with 
a loaded gun. As a result, Menzies was arrested by Shepherd and 
placed on a 72 hour no bail hold at the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Shepherd was informed by the party involved that he did not "want 
to follow through" and Menzies was released from the 72 hour 
hold; however, Shepherd did no further investigation and no 
incident report was filed with the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(Applts' Add., pp. 5-8, 18, 29-32). 
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x. On or about May 9, 1985, Shepherd received a 
loaded .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol from the 
Defendant/Appellee Ralph Menzies. Menzies' parole agreement 
specifically prohibited him from being in possession or contact 
with any type of firearm. Menzies claimed to have taken the 
weapon from another parolee, one Daniel Bee. Shepherd spoke with 
Bee's parole officer, but made no attempt to interview Mr. Bee 
himself to determine the circumstances under which Menzies 
received the pistol. Shepherd believed the act of turning in the 
weapon was a sign of good faith on the part of Menzies, but did 
no further investigation and filed no incident report or report 
of parole violation with the Board of Pardons (Applts' Add., pp. 
1 & 2) . 
y. On or about December 6, 1985 on a tip from an 
informant, Shepherd visited the home of Menzies and located some 
tires which had been stolen from Carmart and located some 
Christmas decorations that had allegedly been stolen from Ernst. 
z. Menzies was arrested and booked into the Salt 
Lake County Jail on or about December 6, 1985 for the theft of 
the tires. No incident report was filed with the Board of 
Pardons and no report of parole violation was filed (Applts' 
Add., p. 10). 
aa. An information to arrest Menzies for theft of 
the Christmas decorations was prepared on or about January 17, 
1986 based at least in part upon information provided by 
Shepherd. No incident report was filed with the Board of Pardons 
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and no report of parole violation was filed (Applts' Add., pp. 
11, 33, 34). 
ab. On or about February 10, 1986, Defendant 
Menzies plead guilty to the theft of the tires before the 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup and the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole and Shepherd were notified of the guilty plea on 
February 11, 1986. No incident report was filed with the Board 
of Pardons and Parole and no report of violation was filed 
(Applts' Add., pp. 35, 37). 
ac. On or about February 22, 1986, Defendant 
Menzies abducted and later murdered the deceased, Maurine 
Hunsaker. Menzies was charged and later convicted of this crime. 
ad. On or about February 24, 1986, Menzies was 
arrested for the theft of Christmas decorations from Ernst even 
though the information was issued in January (Applts' Add., pp. 
12). 
ae. Shepherd requested a warrant to detain 
Menzies on February 27, 1986. Said request was solely based upon 
the arrests and Menzies' guilty plea on February 11, 1986. 
Shepherd admitted that said warrant could have been issued 
previous to that date and was a device to hold Menzies for the 
suspected murder of Maurine Hunsaker and not for the thefts 
(Applts' Add., pp. 13-15). 
af. Prior to the warrant request of February 27, 
1986, no incident reports or reports of parole violations were 
submitted to the Board of Pardons on Defendant Menzies by 
13 
Shepherd or any of his supervisors. This occurred even though 
there were at least four separate acts committed by Menzies and 
admitted to by the State Defendants/Appellees that could be 
considered parole violations (Applts' Add., pp. 37). 
ag. Policies of the Department of Corrections 
that were in effect at the time recruired parole violations to be 
investigated immediately and a report submitted to the Board of 
Pardons within 72 hours (Applts' Add., pp. 57, 58). 
ah. Policy 11.01-A of the Policies and Procedures 
of the Board of Pardons dated August 27, 1984 required the 
submission of incident reports by the supervising parole officer 
to the Board of Pardons when an incident, positive or negative, 
occurred which could affect parolee's status (Applts' Add., pp. 
62, 64). 
ai. Menzies had a history of violent acts, both 
in and out of prison. The Defendant/Appellee Shepherd and his 
supervisors were aware of Menzies violent history. In fact, 
Shepherd described Menzies as having "a long history of criminal 
behavior punctuated by violent acts" (Applts' Add., pp. 16, 17, 
19-26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is an action brought by the survivors of 
Maurine Hunsaker. Mrs. Hunsaker was kidnapped and murdered by 
Ralph LeRoy Menzies on or about February 24, 1986. At the time 
of her abduction, Mrs. Hunsaker was employed by Gas-A-Mat at 
their station located at 3995 West 4700 South, Salt Lake County, 
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Utah. The station was noted for previous robbery attempts and 
the management had posted signs indicating that there was 
electronic surveillance of the area. Mrs. Hunsaker relied upon 
the representations that surveillance was being kept as indicated 
by the signs and believe that the security had been provided for 
by her employer acting in a separate capacity. The Appellants 
believe that the dual capacity doctrine has application in this 
situation and the facts support said application. 
The Defendant, Ralph L. Menzies, was a convicted 
felon on parole, supervisedf and in the custody of Adult 
Probation and Parole, Department of Corrections, State of Utah. 
During his supervised parole, Menzies committed not less than 
four (4) major parole violations, none of which were reported to 
the Utah State Board of Pardons. The failure to report parole 
violations was and is a violation of policy set forth by the 
Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
The relationship between Menzies and AP & P created 
a duty of due care on the part of AP & P to regulate foreseeable 
conduct on the part of Ralph L. Menzies. The State 
Defendants/Appellees failed to take action that was required 
under that policy thereby breaching their duty of due care. 
Menzies had a long history of violent acts and the Department of 
Corrections was aware of this history. Based on the history, the 
parole violations and the policy created by the Division of 
Corrections, a duty of due care to all foreseeable, if not 
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readily identifiable, members of the public existed. By failing 
to report parole violations to the Board of Pardons and Parole, 
the Department breached that duty and the State of Utah, through 
its Department of Corrections, Division of Adult Probation and 




THE DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE IS VIABLE IN UTAH 
AND DOES PROVIDE AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY PROVISION OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has not specifically 
adopted the "dual capacity" doctrine, it has not rejected it 
either. In Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 1985), 
and Stewart v. CMI Corp, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987), the Court 
carefully reviewed the status of dual capacity. While it is true 
that the Court did not apply the dual capacity doctrine in either 
case, it also made it clear that it was not rejecting the 
doctrine. The Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine based 
on the facts of Bingham and Stewart. but did not disagree with 
the substantive law supporting dual capacity. 
The Court, in Bingham, specifically stated that: 
"The argument that the employer owes 
separate duties to employees as owner 
of the premises have generally been 
rejected for the reason that the 
employer's duty to maintain a safe work 
place is inseparable from the 
employer's general duties as an 
employer towards his employees. We 
agree with that reason. See the cases 
discussed at 23 ALR 4th 1163" at 680. 
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This statement supports the general test for dual capacity as set 
forth in McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, 423 N.E.2d 
876, 878 (111. 1981), 
"...The decisive test is whether the 
employer's conduct in the second role 
or capacity has generated obligations 
that are unrelated to those flowing 
from the companies or individuals first 
role as employer. If the obligations 
are related, the doctrine is not 
applicable." 
and cited as authority in Bingham. In the Bingham case, the Utah 
Supreme Court merely found that the test had not been met. That 
employer's obligation to provide a safe work place was the same 
as a contractor or amusement park operator. 
In Stewart, the Plaintiff brought a personal 
injury action against the decedent's former employer. In 
Stewart, the Supreme Court applied the dual capacity doctrine to 
the facts and determined that it did not apply under those 
circumstances. In fact, the Court stated: 
"The dual capacity doctrine does not 
apply in this situation because the 
employer has not assumed a separate and 
distinct obligation toward his employee 
other than as an employer", at p. 1341. 
The Utah Supreme Court had another opportunity to totally reject 
the dual capacity doctrine, but again declined. 
The dual capacity doctrine is a viable doctrine in 
the State of Utah assuming that the factual basis is present. 
Appellants submit that this case does create the situation where 
an employer has taken on a separate obligation and therefore owes 
a separate and distinct duty to the individual rather than just 
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as an employer. 
II. 
BY TAKING ON THE DUTIES OF PROVIDING SECURITY 
AT ITS LOCATION. THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE TOOK ON SEPARATE 
AND DISTINCT OBLIGATIONS FROM THAT AS THE 
DECEASED'S EMPLOYER. 
Gas-A-Mat stepped out of its role as employer and 
into the shoes of the provider of security for its retail 
operations. In doing so, the employer took on additional duties 
and responsibilities. Prior to decedent's employment with Gas-A-
Mat, the Defendant/Appellee installed a sign that read "NOTICE: 
Electronically Protected Against ROBBERY." This gave an 
expectation of security to both employees and patrons of Gas-A-
Mat. Decedent had a right to rely upon Defendant/Appellee's 
assertions that security measures had been taken. By stepping 
into the shoes of the provider of security, the 
Defendant/Appellee also took on the responsibility of acting as a 
reasonable provider of security would act. When a party assumes 
a burden or an obligation, that party has a duty to exercise the 
normal skill and care anyone in that position would exercise. 
In placing the sign, the Defendant/Appellee 
indicated to all who read it that certain security measures that 
had been taken. Therefore, Defendant/Appellee is charged with 
the duties and obligations with which any other provider of 
security would be charged. In the Trial Court, 
Defendant/Appellee cited Thomas v. General Electric Company, 493 
S.W. 2d 493 (Tenn. 1973) for the proposition that 
Defendant/Appellee had no obligation to provide security to the 
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decedent and it was correct. As an employer, the 
Defendant/Appellee did not have an obligation to provide 
security. This is reinforced by the Thomas Court quoting Am Jur 
2d: 
"Under some circumstances, an employer 
has been held liable to his employee 
for injuries resulting from assault by 
a third person where the employer but 
not the employee had knowledge or 
notice of unusual risk of assault by 
third persons and the employee failed 
to warn the employee of that danger. 
Ordinarily, however, an employer is 
under no legal duty to protect his 
employees from unlawful assault by 
strangers and is not as a rule to be 
held liable for the intentional injury 
to or killing of his employee by a 
third person." at 194 (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the any obligation to the decedent was not arising out 
of her employment, but out of the dual capacity. Appellants 
submit that Defendant/Appellee's assumption of the obligation of 
providing security to the location and failing to do so created 
the separate duty. 
III. 
AS AN OWNER OF THE PROPERTY AND A PROVIDER OF 
SECURITY, THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO 
ALL THIRD PARTIES ENTERING UPON THE PREMISES 
TO ACT REASONABLY IN PRECLUDING ANY HARM FROM 
COMING TO SAID INDIVIDUALS. 
Defendant/Appellee is liable for decedent's death 
due to the negligent manner in which it maintained the premises 
and provided security. While the owner of the premises and the 
provider of security are certainly not insurers of the safety of 
every individual that enters upon the premises, it does have a 
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responsibility to act in a safe and reasonable manner. This duty 
is based to a large extent on the status of the person on the 
premises. Due to Gas-A-Mat's dual capacity , the decedent's 
status was not that of an employee, but rather that of a business 
invitee with a reasonable expectation of competent security 
measures. 
An individual or business entity in no special 
circumstances has no duty to protect another from criminal attack 
by a third party. However, a business, particularly when the 
business has taken affirmative steps to provide security, has the 
duty of exercising ordinary care to maintain its premises in a 
reasonably safe condition and to provide security in a reasonably 
safe and competent manner. This obligation goes so far as to 
include protecting patrons from criminal acts of a third party, 
Totten v. More Oakland Residential Housing, Inc., 134 Cal Rptr 32 
(1976) and even extends so far as taking reasonable and competent 
measures to protect the personnel performing the security 
activities, see Pucalik v. Holiday Inns, 777 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 
1985). 
The Restatement of the Law of Torts, Second §344 
specifies that anyone holding land open to the public for 
business purposes is liable to the members of the public, while 
they are on the land, for injuries caused by the intentionally 
harmful acts of third persons. This, of course, is only true if 
the possessor of the land fails to take reasonable care governing 
such acts or did not give adequate warning. If injurious conduct 
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can be anticipated, the business has a public duty to exercise 
reasonable care to protect its customers against that danger. 
Gas-A-Mat was not only holding its business premises 
out for public use, but had also undertaken security measures to 
protect both patrons and others lawfully on the premises. Gas-A-
Mat , due to the two previous robberies, was well aware of the 
dangers that existed. The placing of the sign is clear evidence 
of this fact. Gas-A-Mat not only had to take reasonable 
precautions as the possessor of land, but also reasonable steps 
as a provider of security. 
The key question in determining whether or not the 
possessor of the property and the provider of security is 
negligent centers around foreseeability. If it is foreseeable 
for certain injuries to occur, the owner of the premises and 
provider of security can be held liable. See Barker v. Wah Low, 
97 Cal Rptr 85 (1971), Slater v. Alpha Beta, 118 Cal Rptr 561 
(1975), Totten v. More Oakland Residential supra. Young v. Desert 
View Management Corporation, 79 Cal Rptr 848 (1969). 
These cases stand for the concept that an owner of 
property has a duty to protect his business invitees from 
foreseeable harm. This duty to take reasonable precautions is 
strengthened even further by Gas-A-Mat's assumption of security 
obligations. 
The question of foreseeability in this case is 
answered by Gas-A-Mat itself. Gas-A-Mat's installation of the 
robbery warning sign clearly indicates that it was aware of a 
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potentially dangerous situation. It undertook to provide the 
security by the installing the sign, but took none of the 
measures that the sign indicated had been taken. In this case, 
it was the duty of Gas-A-Mat to take ordinary care both as the 
occupier of the land and as the provider of security. This is 
particularly true where it had knowledge that a course of conduct 
on the part of an individual on the premises could endanger the 
lives of the invitees. See Porter v. California Jockey Club, 
Inc., 285 P.2d 60 (1962)# Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc., 52 Cal 
Rptr 561 (1966) and Edward v. Hollywood Canteen, 167 P.2d 729. 
IV. 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE 
DUAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE DUE TO INACTION BY 
THE STATE LEGISLATURE 
This Court has recognized that, in general, the 
State Legislature has the duty to modify legislation, see Bingham 
and Stewart. However, the Court has also recognized that, in the 
absence of action by the State Legislature, the Court has the 
authority and the duty to adopt changes, see Wade v. Jobe, 818 
P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991) and P.H. Investment v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 




In reviewing the Trial Court's Minute Entry filed on 
April 5, 1991, one thing is painfully clear. The Court failed to 
understand the arguments as set forth by the Appellants. 
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Appellants therefore feel it is important to step through each 
point of the argument so that the basis for Appellants' claim is 
clear. 
It is well established in Utah law and elsewhere 
that a negligence action has four (4) elements. These elements 
are duty, breach of the standard of care, causation and damagesf 
see The Law of Torts §30, at 143 (W.L. Prosser 4th Edition 1971). 
The Trial Court read Appellants' assertions as to duty 
incorrectly. The Trial Court apparently believed that Appellants 
asserted that some relationship existed between the decedent, 
Maurine Hunsaker, and the State Defendants/Appellees. That is 
clearly not the case. The Appellants have argued consistently 
throughout this matter that the special relationship was between 
the State Defendants/Appellees and Menzies, not Maurine Hunsaker. 
Therefore, the analysis set forth by the Trial Court in its 
Minute Entry is substantially flawed. In addition, Appellants 
have never asserted that a duty is created simply by the 
promulgation of procedures or regulations. Rather, Plaintiff has 
argued that the duty exists and that the promulgation of 
regulations and procedures sets forth the standard of care to be 
met. The Trial Court was mistaken in its belief that Appellants' 
asserted that the duty is created by promulgation of regulations. 




A DUTY OF DUE CARE EXISTED BETWEEN THE 
DECEDENT AND THE STATE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES 
The Trial Court relied heavily on three Utah cases 
in determining whether a duty existed under these circumstances. 
These decisions are Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (1989), 
Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1989) and Kirk v. State, 
784 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1989). Appellants' assert that these cases 
are consistent with their position. In Ferree, the Court also 
relied on Thompson v. County of Alameda, 613 P.2d 728 (Cal 1980). 
It is important to note the factual basis behind 
Ferree, Thompson and Kirk. These cases turned on the question on 
whether the State would be responsible for the release of a 
violent individual. In Ferree, the inmate was released into the 
general population, on a weekend pass, without supervision by the 
Department of Corrections. In Kirk, the inmate was not released, 
but escaped from the control of the Department of Corrections. 
In this case, Menzies at all times was subject to the direction 
and control of the Department of Corrections because of its duty 
and responsibility to supervise his parole. Those factual 
distinctions are critical. 
In Ferree, the Court specifically referred to the 
action of releasing prisoners or placing them on parole when 
discussing the duty issue. The Court has consistently held that 
the discretionary acts of releasing or placing a person in a 
particular program does not create a duty towards the public in 
general, see Doe v. Arauelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) citing 
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Little v, Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2D 49 
(Utah 1983), Payton v. United States, 679 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 
1982); Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982); Johnson v. 
State, 69 Cal. 2d 782f 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2D 352 (1968); 
Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1155 (1981), and Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 773 
(1981). In Doe v. Aroruelles, the Court's inquiry didn't end with 
the release. The Court went on to examine the quality of 
supervision and, based on the lack of supervision, found a basis 
for liability. The Court said: 
A decision or action implementing a preexisting policy 
is operational in nature and is undeserving of 
protection under the discretionary function exception. 
Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 
P.2d at 52; Bioelow v. Inaersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 
1980); Frank v. State, 613 P.2D 517 (Utah 1980). 
Because a probation officer's policy decisions are 
discretionary, he is immune from suit arising from 
those decisions. However, his acts implementing the 
policy must be considered on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether they are ministerial and thereby 
outside the immunity protections. Semler v. 
Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 
(4th Cir. 1976) (citing Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d at 
362). 
Even in Ferree, the Court recognized that the 
obligation to control the conduct of a "dangerous" person could 
very well create a duty of due care on the part of corrections 
officials. The Court in Ferree also quoted Grimm v. Arizona 
Board of Pardons and Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Az. 1977) and 
Cancler v. State, 675 P.2d 57 (Ks 1984). Both of these cases 
involve parolees with known dangerous propensities. 
Therefore, even in Ferree, the Court saw that under certain 
circumstances, there could be a duty created in the supervision 
of a parolee by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
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The Court went further in Owens and set forth more 
specifically what circumstances could create that duty. In 
Owens, the Utah Court determined that there was a duty to control 
a third person or a duty to warn if 
(a) A special relation exists between 
the [defendant] and the third person 
which imposes a duty on the rdefendant] 
to control the third person's conduct 
or 
(b) A special relation exists between 
the [defendant] and the other which 
gives rise to the other right to 
protection from [from the third 
person]. 
Owens at Page 1188. (Emphasis added). 
The question of the special relationship on the part of the State 
Defendants/Appellees goes not only to a relationship between the 
State Defendants/Appellees and any potential victims, but also to 
the nature of the relationship between the actor, in this case 
Menzies, and the State Defendants/Appellees. 
A sufficient relationship existed between State 
Defendants and Menzies to establish a duty of due care. In this 
case, the Affidavits of the State Defendants/Appellees, clearly 
show that there was a relationship between Menzies and the State 
Defendants. They discussed the ability that Shepherd had to pick 
up Menzies, supervise him, perform unscheduled home visits, 
require him to meet all the terms and conditions of his parole, 
and in all other ways, by major part, control his life. 
There is no dispute that a special relationship 
existed between the State Defendants/Appellees and Ralph Menzies. 
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While the Supreme Court did not find that such a relationship 
existed between Garfield and the defendants in the Owens v. 
Garfield case, the Court did cite three cases as examples where 
those relationships could be found. Those cases are Cansler v. 
State, 675 P.2d 57 (Ka. 1984) (incarcerated criminal); Peterson 
v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wa. 1983) (confined mental patient); 
Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986) 
(parolee who had exhibited dangerous tendencies in prison)• An 
examination of these cases gives a great deal of insight into 
what is necessary to find a duty of due care in a situation 
involving the control of a third party. 
The Utah courts have looked to Division of 
Corrections v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986). In Neakok, 
the State argued that, as a supervisor of an individual's parole 
it was not sufficiently close to give rise to a duty to control 
him and that a duty should be limited to actual custody. The 
Court in Neakok rejected that argument and stated: 
We do not believe that a duty to control or warn can 
be so narrowly limited. Although the State was 
required to release Nukapigak who remained under 
State supervision as a parolee it could regulate his 
movements within the State, require him to report to 
a parole officer under conditions set by that officer 
or prison counselor, require him to undergo treatment 
for alcoholism, and impose and enforce special 
conditions of parole . . . it could revoke his parole 
and reincarcerate him if he violated these 
conditions. 
Neakok at 1126. 
The special relationship the State Defendants have 
with the parolee because of its ability to foresee dangers and to 
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control the activities of the parolee is sufficient to impose a 
duty of due care on the State. The Court in Neakok went on to 
determine other factors that must be present where the victim is 
not subject to ready identification. 
There is no question in this case that there was 
little or no contact between Menzies and the decedent, Maurine 
Hunsaker. The Court in Neakok dealt with that issue in 
determining whether it is foreseeable that a person could be 
endangered by the parolee. With Menzies, his previous crimes 
would indicate that he would be a danger to anyone engaged in 
serving the public. In Neakok, the Court stated: 
Where the State, through its negligence, allows a 
parolee to cause foreseeable harm to a third person, 
we see no reason to predicate liability wholly on the 
State's ability to predict the victim's name. A 
victim may be "foreseeable" without being 
specifically identifiable. 
Neakok at 1129. Maurine Hunsaker fit the "class" of persons who 
were within foreseeable dangere at the hands of Menzies based on 
his past criminal record. The State Defendants/Appellees were 
very much aware of Menzies past record and his tendencies toward 
violence. That was eloquently stated by Mr. Shepherd in his pre-
sentence report. Mr. Shepherd also recognized and admitted that 
the information was nothing new to him, that he was well aware of 
Menzies tendencies and violent behavior prior to the pre-sentence 
report. Again the Appellants would draw the Court's attention to 
the proposition that the question of foreseeability of the 
party's actions not the identity of the victim was the turning 
point in Neakok. The issue then turned to the duty to protect a 
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reasonably foreseeable victim from a clearly dangerous 
individual. These facts are what give rise to a duty of due care 
on the part of the State and its employees. 
The question of foreseeability was raised in Ferree 
and by the Trial Court in this case during oral argument. 
Menzies' previous criminal history is a more than adequate 
demonstration of his dangerous propensities. Menzies was in 
prison at the time he was paroled for both escape and for 
aggravated robbery in which an individual was shot. Shepherd 
himself identified Menzies' propensities in his pre-sentence 
report when he said "[Menzies] has a long history of criminal 
behavior punctuated by violent acts.•' When questioned during 
his deposition, Shepherd admitted that he was aware of Menzies 
violent propensities prior to writing the pre-sentence report and 
even at the beginning of his supervision of Menzies parole. 
Menzies' actions were foreseeable. 
The danger of creating a duty in this manner, which 
was raised by the Supreme Court in Ferree, is not applicable in 
this particular case. Here we are talking about the duty created 
by the relationship between the Department of Corrections and 
Ralph Menzies. Even under the standard advance by Neakok and 
Owens, there still must be evidence of violent propensities and 
the Department must be aware of a those violent propensities 
before any duty is created. 
In Ferree, the Court specifically relied on the fact 
that the Defendant had shown no previous violent propensities; 
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Menzies did. Shepherd, in his testimony and in his pre-sentence 
report, made it clear that the State Defendants/Appellees were 
well aware of Menzies' violent propensities at the time he was 
placed on parole. This then created a duty on the part of the 
State Defendants/Appellees to properly supervise and control 
Menzies' behavior. Maurine Hunsaker, even if not readily 
identifiable, in working with the public, was clearly within the 
range of foreseeability as to Menzies' violent acts. Menzies 
most recent violent act, prior to his parole, was the aggravated 
robbery and shooting of a taxi cab driver. This driver was also 
working with the public. Therefore, the attack on Maurine 
Hunsaker as a person serving the public was foreseeable. 
VII. 
STATE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES BREACHED THE STANDARD OF 
CARE BY FAILING TO FOLLOW THEIR OWN 
ESTABLISHED PROCEDURE 
As set forth above, the second element of negligence 
is a breach of the standard of care. In this case, the State 
Defendants/Appellees had a great deal of latitude in making 
discretionary decisions. However, if the actions by the State 
Defendants/Appellees do not fall within the category of 
discretionary, they are within the scope of what constitutes due 
care. See Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367 (Utah 1968) and 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). An act which requires 
the exercise of discretion on the part of an agent or supervisor 
may be negligent, but a claim may be barred by the governmental 
immunity provisions referred to in the above-cited cases. In 
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this case, however, Appellants are not arguing that Shepherd 
and/or his supervisors failed to properly exercise discretionary 
authority, but, rather, that they failed to comply with 
established procedures within their own department and the 
actions were ministerial in nature and not protected, see Doe v. 
Arquelles, supra. 
The State Defendants/Appellees argued that the 
creation of policies and procedures do not create a duty of due 
care. This may in fact be true. However, the policies and 
procedures do set the standard to be followed in dealing with 
specific occurrences. The State Defendants/Appellees set up a 
procedure to be followed in the event of parole violations. This 
procedure was to report all parole violations to the Board of 
Pardons. In the case of Ralph Menzies, that procedure was not 
followed. 
The Department of Corrections and the Board of 
Pardons had complete control over the conduct of Ralph Menzies. 
In the event that he did not comply with the terms and conditions 
of parole, his parole could be revoked or he could have been 
placed in a much more restrictive setting. Whether the Board of 
Pardons actually took those kind of measures against Menzies is 
not the question here, because the Board of Pardons never had the 
opportunity to take them. 
While State Defendants/Appellees argued that the 
policies of reporting violations to the Board of Pardons were 
internal policies and had no effect on Maurine Hunsaker, the 
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argument is without merit. The Department of Corrections, 
Division of Adult Probation and Parole, the agency charged with 
supervision of Menzies, had no authority to revoke parole. It 
only had the authority to report violations and make 
recommendations as to appropriate measures to be taken to 
properly supervise a parolee. The decision as to what measures 
should be taken was solely within the discretion of the Board of 
Pardons. Therefore, the failure on the part of Adult Probation 
and Parole to report repeated parole violations by Menzies to the 
Board of Pardons effectively prevented the Board of Pardons from 
exercising its authority and its responsibility over the parolee. 
In Doe v. Arquelles, supra. the Court recognized 
that the failure on the part of a parole officer to properly 
monitor the actions of his parolee constituted a breach of the 
standard of care. In Doe v. Arquelles, the Court specifically 
indicated that if damages are proximately caused by the parole 
officer's negligence, then the standard elements of negligence 
law apply. 
Menzies, an inmate with known violent tendencies, 
was placed into the custody of the Department of Corrections, 
Division of Adult Probation and Parole. This created a 
relationship between Menzies and the State Defendants/Appellees 
such that they had a duty to control the conduct of Menzies under 
these circumstances. This duty extended to all persons for whom 
it was reasonably foreseeable that they could be harmed by 
Menzies. Maurine Hunsaker, working at a job where she served the 
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public, was clearly within that realm of foreseeability. The 
Department of Corrections established specific procedures to keep 
the Board of Pardons and Parole informed of violations or 
exceptional conduct on the part of parolees. These procedures 
were set up to insure that the decision making body# the Board of 
Pardons and Parole, could fully exercise its authority regarding 
its ability to control the conduct of parolees. The Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole, through its reporting procedures, 
was an integral part of this authority to control the conduct of 
Ralph Menzies. The Defendants breached the standard of care by 
failing to follow their own procedures and file reports. 
It has been admitted by the State 
Defendants/Appellees that the Defendant Menzies violated his 
parole on at least four occasions and the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
assert he violated it not less than six times and probably more. 
Yet none of these violations were ever reported to the Board of 
Pardons and Parole. Therefore, Adult Probation and Parole, the 
State Defendants/Appellees, violated the standard of due care and 
breached its duty to Maurine Hunsaker. 
The State Defendants/Appellees have argued that to 
place liability upon the State in this particular circumstance 
would place liability upon the State and its agents whenever 
prison rehabilitation failed. The Supreme Court, in theory, also 
made that statement. However, there is a significant distinction 
here. In this case, special conditions existed to create the 
duty. That in and of itself does not impose liability upon the 
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State Defendants/Appellees. All the State Defendants/Appellees 
had to do to avoid liability was to meet the standard of care. 
Had Shepherd and his supervisors submitted all the reports to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and otherwise followed the Division 
procedures, the standard of care would have been met and no 
liability could be imposed. 
The State is basically asking the Court to allow it 
to set up policies and procedures, not comply and still not be 
held to have breached the standard of care. No one is 
suggesting that merely because a parolee commits a violent act 
that the State is liable. But if the State fails to do its job, 
and that failure is based on nondiscretionary actions, then the 
State should be liable for its actions. 
VIII. 
CAUSATION IS QUESTION OF FACT TO BE 
DETERMINED BY THE JURY IN THIS MATTER 
Causation is the one issue that with a substantial 
number of facts in dispute. Victoria Palacios, in her affidavit, 
basically states that she does not think that the Board of 
Pardons would have revoked Menzies' parole under the 
circumstances presented to her. It is important for the Court to 
note that not all of the alleged parole violations are contained 
in Ms. Palacios' affidavit. In fact, that is the very problem 
all throughout this case. The Board of Pardons and Parole was 
never informed fully about the circumstances surrounding Menzies' 
activities. Certainly, we can look back with 20/20 hindsight, 
review all of the documentation, and say the Board of Pardons 
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would or would not have done this. Unfortunately, that is going 
to be speculation at best. That decision needs to be made by the 
finder of fact, in this case the jury, Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). 
State Defendants/Appellees argued that even with the 
information the Board of Pardons would not have revoked Menzies' 
parole. That may in fact be true. However, revocation was not 
the only option available to the Board of Pardons. Menzies was 
to receive mental health counseling throughout his parole. He 
only had two (2) sessions with Dr. Brockbank and was then told 
that additional mental health counseling would do no good. The 
State Defendants/Appellees did nothing to inform the Board of 
Pardons that Menzies was not meeting a condition of his parole. 
Had they done so, the Board of Pardons could have taken 
additional action in regard to that special condition. However, 
it will never be known what the Board would have done. We can 
only speculate as to what the Board of Pardons would have done if 
the Department had met its standard of care in providing them 
with information. 
Appellants informed the Trial Court that they 
intended, through discovery, to review the actions of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole from August 1, 1984 through March 1, 1986. 
The evidence gathered from discovery would have been presented to 
the jury. The Trial Court improperly terminated this process. 
Even though the matter was presented on summary judgment and 
questions of fact clearly existed, the Trial Court said that 
35 
there was no evidence that the withheld information would have 
affected the actions, or inaction, of the Board of Pardons. In 
making this decision, without any findings of fact, the Trial 
Court usurped the authority of the fact finder. 
It is the intent of the Appellants to only touch 
upon the issue of damages at this point. It is clear that the 
Appellants have suffered damage as a result of Maurine Hunsaker's 
death. There is substantial evidence to be presented in that 
regard, but that is clearly a question of fact and it was not 
appropriate for the Trial Court to hear. It may be argued that 
if there are no damages there is no cause of action. The 
Appellants would merely submit to the Court that there can be no 
question that damages were suffered. The questions surround the 
issues of duty, breach, and causation. 
IX. 
STATE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT. IMMUNITY, IF ANY, IS A 
"QUALIFIED" IMMUNITY SUBJECT, TO AN 
APPLICATION OF THE SPECIFIC FACTS OF EACH 
CASE TO THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE ACT 
The State Defendants/Appellees argued that its 
entities were immune from suit under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act (hereafter "Act"). Indeed, the Department of 
Corrections, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole perform governmental functions and 
may be, therefore, entitled to whatever measure of immunity from 
suit that is provided by the Act. See Sheffield v. Turner, 445 
P.2d 367, 368 (Utah 1968). However, according to §63-30-3, 
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immunity of governmental entities is only a qualified immunity 
being subject to various exceptions. §63-30-10 enumerates 
specific exceptions to the immunity enjoyed by State entities. 
Subsection (1) states: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function whether 
or not the discretion is abused. 
X. 
THERE IS NO IMMUNITY TO A STATE 
DEFENDANT WHOSE ACTS CONSTITUTE 
THE PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTERIAL FUNCTION 
The key consideration of immunity in regard to a 
particular governmental entity is an understanding of where the 
line of demarcation between a discretionary function and a 
ministerial function lies. The purpose for such a distinction is 
that the Utah Supreme Court has extended immunity to entities 
performing a discretionary function, but has consistently denied 
such protection to those performing a ministerial duty. In 
holding that a City court clerk and her deputy were not immune 
from a negligence action after improperly docketing court 
records, the Court expressly stated that in the performance of a 
ministerial duty such immunity should not be granted, Connell v. 
Tooele City. 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977). 
The Utah Supreme Court has struggled with the precise 
definition to adopt in identifying and separating ministerial and 
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discretionary functions. More recently, the Utah Supreme Court 
has specifically defined its view of the discretionary, 
ministerial dichotomy stating: 
a discretionary function under Section 63-
30-10(1) is confined to those decisions 
and acts occurring at the basic policy 
making level, and not extended to those 
acts and decisions taking place at the 
operational level, or, in other words, 
those which concern routine, everyday 
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy factors." Bigelow v. Inqersoll, 
618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980), see also 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 
1980). 
The Supreme Court of California has emphasized the 
importance of avoiding a literal interpretation of the term 
"discretion." In Johnson v. State, 447 P.2d 352, 357 (Cal. 
1968), the Court ruled that the State is not immune from a 
negligence action where a parole officer failed to warn the 
plaintiff of foreseeable, latent danger in accepting the youth, 
as a result, the plaintiff was assaulted by the youth. In its 
holding the Court stated, "it would be difficult to conceive of 
any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did 
not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance," 
at 362. 
In Carroll v. State, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (Utah 1972), 
the Utah Supreme Court echoed Johnson by holding that the 
decision of a road supervisor to use earthen berms in lieu of 
signs to warn drivers of an abandoned and dangerous road was 




AN EXTENSION OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
IS A "FACTS SENSITIVE ISSUE", WHICH 
MUST BE DETERMINED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS 
This case focuses on a facts sensitive issue. In 
such situations, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated, for 
example, that the decision to place a youth, previously committed 
to a Youth Detention Center, into the community was a 
discretionary function, the "probation officer's...acts 
implementing the policy must be considered on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether they are ministerial and thereby 
outside the immunity protections" Doe v. Arquelles, 716 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1985). Hence, the Court's method of analysis in 
determining whether the probation officer's actions constituted 
actionable negligence or were immune from such action focused on 
his behavior following the youth's release from the detention 
center. The analysis in the here should parallel that conducted 
by the Court in Arquelles, and is evidenced by its statement: 
if it can be shown at trial that the 
injury to plaintiff's ward was proximately 
caused by Stromberg's (the parole officer) 
omissions, it did not result from the 
discretion vested in him to place 
Arguelles in the community, but from his 
negligence in monitoring the prescribed 
treatment after making the discretionary 
decision to do so. Under those 
circumstances, the State would not be 
immune from suit under the discretionary 
function exception. 
Id. at 283. 
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XII. 
THE APPROPRIATE TEST IN DETERMINING 
THE NATURE OF THE ACTS OF THE STATE DEFENDANTS /APPELLEES 
IS THE MINISTERIAL OR PLANNING-OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS 
The State cited Eptincr v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 244 
(Utah 1976) and State v. Kirk, supra to support its immunity 
position. These cases are readily distinguished from the present 
case. In Eptina, like Ferree, the release itself was questioned. 
In Kirk, the inmate was either still incarcerated or had fled all 
means of control by the State. In either event, the State was 
not liable. Here, Menzies was under the control of the State 
Defendants/Appellees and the release itself was not questioned, 
only the supervision and implementation. The facts of this case 
more closely parallel Doe v. Arguelles than Eptina or Kirk. 
Carroll v. State Road Commission, 496 P.2d 888, 891 
(Utah 1972) expressly embraced the ministerial or planning-
operational analysis, as it is also referred to, as the 
appropriate methodology in determining the proper situations to 
grant immunity to the State. See also, Connell v. Tooele City, 
572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977), Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 
1980), Biaelow v. Inqersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), Little v. 
State, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 
(Utah 1985) . 
Analogizing to this case, the critical issue is not 
whether it was a discretionary function to place Menzies on 
parole, but rather, whether it was ministerial functions that 
were violated by the State Department of Corrections and the 
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parole officer in failing to implement and follow their own 
procedures. 
XIII. 
STATE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES HAVE WAIVED THE IMMUNITY 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND 
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE 
The State Defendants/Appellees waived the immunity 
of the Department of Corrections and Adult Probation and Parole 
as provided under the Act. As stated in Smith, Clay M., Utah Law 
Rev., "Misapplication of Governmental Immunity," 186, 188 (1976), 
"the landmark case on the question of what constitutes a 
discretionary function for which immunity is not waived is Indian 
Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)." In deciding 
that the Coast Guard's failure to operate a lighthouse, which it 
had previously committed to do, constituted actionable negligence 
the court stated: 
once it (the Coast Guard) exercised its 
discretion to operate a light on 
Chandeleur Island and engendered 
reliance on the guidance afforded by 
the light, it was obligated to use due 
care to make certain that the light was 
kept in good working order; if the 
light did become extinguished, then the 
Coast Guard was further obligated to 
use due care to discover this fact and 
to repair the light or give warning 
that it was not functioning. 
Id. at 69. 
A pivotal case closely comparable to the one now 
before the Court, and which exemplifies the liability taken upon 
governmental entities engaging in the treatment of known felons, 
was decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona, Grimm v. Arizona 
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Board of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Arizona 1977). Grimm 
held that the plaintiffs, parents of a man who was killed by a 
parolee during a robbery, were allowed to bring suit against the 
Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles. The Court stated, "we hold 
that absolute immunity for public officials in their 
discretionary functions acting in other than true judicial 
proceedings is not required and, indeed, is improper," the Court 
then concluded, "we now abolish the absolute immunity previously 
granted public officials in their discretionary functions" Id. at 
1232, 1233. 
Accordingly, by failing to follow its own policies 
and procedures, the State has waived its right to immunity which 
is otherwise granted under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 (1986). 
Improper supervision and implementation of policies were not 
discretionary decisions, but were instead grounded in the 
typical, mechanical, structured activity mandated by the rules. 
Because of the ministerial nature of the activities out of which 
the negligence arose, this Court should deny the State 
Defendant/Appellees' request to be blanketed under the immunity 
privilege which is appropriately reserved only for truly 
discretionary functions. 
XIV. 
THE STATE DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES ARE NOT ENTITLED 
TO IMMUNITY UNDER THE INCARCERATIONS 
OF PERSONS EXCEPTION OF THE ACT 
The State Defendants/Appellees unjustifiably argued 
that they were entitled to immunity under the Incarceration of 
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Persons Exception of the Act. §63-30-10 (1) and subsection (j) 
(1986) reads: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out 
of the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison, county, or city jail or 
other place of legal confinement; 
The State cited Epting and Kirk, in its attempt to convince the 
Trial Court that any injuries caused by a person who is 
incarcerated grants the State absolute immunity. In his 
dissenting opinion in Epting, Justice Maughan explains the 
meaning of the terms "arising out of the incarceration," he 
states that it "could only mean injuries arising while the 
incarcerated person was in the prison, or under the direct 
control of the State, while laboring on a public work" Epting v. 
State, 546 P.2d 242, 246 (Utah 1976). 
The case of Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367 (Utah 
1968) dealt specifically with the meaning and application of the 
incarceration exception of the Act. The Court held that a prison 
inmate was barred from bringing a negligence action against the 
Warden of the Utah State Prison for injuries inflicted by a 
fellow inmate. In its holding the Court defined the limitations 
of the incarceration exception stating: 
there can be no question but that the 
maintenance of a state prison and the 
keeping of prisoners therein is a 
necessary auxiliary of government... it is 
appropriate to point out that this does 
not constitute a carte blanche protection 
for anything that may be done or permitted 
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in a prison. 
Id. at 368. Hence, if this privilege does not extend to every 
situation which takes place in a prison, certainly it would not 
extend to the supervision by the parole system. The issues 
raised by Kirk have been dealt with previously. 
The failure of the State to properly perform its 
responsibilities and duties in supervising the parole of Ralph 
LeRoy Menzies constitutes a waiver of the immunity otherwise 
granted to it under the incarceration exception. 
CONCLUSION 
In the State of Utah, unlike other states, employees 
who suffer injuries due to the gross negligence of their 
employers have no statutory right to redress. The dual capacity 
doctrine gives employees, under certain circumstances, those 
rights. While the State Legislature has not adopted the dual 
capacity doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court has the authority to do 
so. 
In this case, Gas-A-Mat intentionally led its 
customers and its employees to believe that they were being 
protected by security. In doing so, Gas-A-Mat removed itself 
from its sole role as the employer of Maurine Hunsaker. By 
claiming that it was providing security, Gas-A-Mat stepped into 
that new role. As such, Gas-A-Mat is charged with the ordinary 
duties and responsibilities of that role. 
By indicating to the public and its employees that 
security was being provided, Gas-A-Mat had an obligation to 
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provide that security. It did not. Due to Gas-A-Mat's failure 
to simply do what it said it had done, Maurine Hunsaker was 
abducted and murdered. The dual capacity doctrine fits the 
circumstances of this case and should be adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court. This matter should then be remanded to the Trial 
Court for further hearing and the taking of evidence on the 
issues of negligence. 
It is clear that the Trial Court's analysis of 
Appellants' position as to the State Defendants is substantially 
flawed. The Appellants have properly argued that a duty existed 
to Maurine Hunsaker, not out of any special relationship between 
Mrs. Hunsaker and the State Defendants, but rather out of the 
relationship between Ralph Menzies and the State Defendants. 
Ralph Menzies was a clearly dangerous individual. The State of 
Utah, through the Department of Corrections, Division of Adult 
Probation and Parole, had a statutory duty to supervise and 
control the behavior of Ralph Menzies. Because of this statutory 
duty, a duty to the general public arose. 
Menzies' actions towards Maurine Hunsaker, or rather 
to individuals in the same position as Maurine Hunsaker, were 
clearly foreseeable. Had the State Defendants complied with 
their own policies and procedures, Maurine Hunsaker would still 
be alive. Instead, the State now argues that it had no reason to 
think that Menzies was a dangerous person. That argument flies 
in the face of reason. That State's duty to supervise Menzies 
extended to a duty to protect foreseeable victims from his 
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behavior. The State failed in that duty. 
This Court should reverse the Trial Court's decision 
on summary judgment and enter judgment in favor of the Appellants 
as to the issues of duty and breach. This Court should then 
remand the case back to the Trial Court further hearing on the 
questions of causation and damages. 
Dated this _3 of tfj.juj!, , 1992 
Respectfully Submitted, 
'P. 
Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 870904084 PI 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. : 
The Court having heard oral argument on and having 
considered the various memorandum in support of and in 
opposition to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
now being fully advised in the premises makes and enters this 
its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is aware of the position of the plaintiffs to 
the effect that there is no duty of care running to the decedent 
from the defendants other than if a special relationship exists 
which give rise to that duty. The "special circumstances" as 
alleged in this case is based on two factors urged by the 
plaintiff. First the duty arises because the decedent Maurine 
Hunsaker was in a "special relationship" by reason of working 
HDHSAKER V STATE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
with the public. The plaintiff contends that the most recent 
/iolent act prior to his parole by Ralph Menzies was the 
aggravated robbery and shooting of a taxi driver. He further 
contends that the plaintiff's probation officer knew of the 
violent propensities of Ralph Menzies and knew of the shooting 
of the taxi driver. That knowledge is then coupled with the 
fact that the probation officer failed to report all parole 
violations to the Board of Pardons thus violating internal 
procedures established by the Board of Pardons. The parole 
violations were not the commission of other violent crimes but 
rather the violation of some remedial terms of parole. Thus the 
plaintiff's position is that the decedent Maurine Hunsaker was 
in a "special relationship11 to the defendants and in addition 
that by reason of violation of the parole boards internal 
reporting procedures and thus its standards the duty to the 
decendent was breached by the defendants. The Court has some 
substantial difficulty with this analysis. It seems to the 
undersigned that the rather arbitrary classification of "persons 
who work with the public" is simply not a sufficient definition 
of a certain person or class of persons to be protected by their 
"special circumstances". The fact of the matter is almost 
everybody in service industries can be regarded as working with 
the public and that can run from professors and teachers in 
colleges and high schools to service station attendants, to bank 
V STATE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
tellers, to court employees, to judges, to car hops at drive inns 
(there are still two in the State of Utah) to police officers, 
cab drivers and a whole myriad of persons. That classification 
becomes so general that I believe it becomes self defeating and 
cannot possibly qualify for the "special relation or special 
circumstances" definition as set forth in the various applicable 
Utah cases. 
Additionally the Court is not convinced that the failure 
to report all parole violations to the Board of Pardons would be 
regarded as a violation of the duty even if one existed in favor 
of the decedent. There is no evidence that the parole board 
would have changed the parole conditions of Mr. Menzies nor 
revoked it nor in any other way take any action which would have 
afforded greater protection to either a reasonable classification 
of persons in which Maurine Hunsaker fell or to Mrs. Hunsaker 
herself. Thus it is the Courts opinion that the State in this 
case did not have a duty to protect Mrs. Hunsaker in any manner 
above and different from the duty of protection to the general 
public which general duty is not even alleged to have been 
breached and therefore the Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. In addition there is no clear showing that the 
violation complained of would have in any way effected the 
parole status of the perpetrator and thus changed the tragic 
outcome of this set of circumstances. For these reasons, inter 
alia, and the ones set forth in the defendants7 Memorandum in 
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Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary Judgment is 
granted. Counsel for the defendants will prepare an appropriate 
order and summary judgment. 
DATED this day of April, 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Mariane Baldwin 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 403 




R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
FRANK MYLAR (5116) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801-265-5638 
Third Judicial Disttict 
By. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




STATE OF UTAH, et ai., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
STATE DEFENDANTS 
Case No, 870904084 PI 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
THE COURT having considered Defendants State of Utah, Gary 
Deland, Utah State Department of Corrections, Utah Board of 
Pardons, Myron March, Ray Wahl, Kent Jones, Joe Smout, John 
Shepard, and Utah State Adult Probation & Parole's (hereafter 
"State Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, together with all 
documents and memoranda filed in support of defendants motion and 
all memoranda and documents filed by plaintiff's objecting to 
defendants' motion and further having heard oral argument of 
counsel and having found no geniue issues of material fact, and 
good cause appearing, the Court now makes the following ruling: 
1. Neither the State of Utah nor its entities and officials 
owed a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to defendant 
Menzies' alleged murder of Maurine Hunsaker. 
2. The State defendants are immune from suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
3. The Utah Board of Pardons and its officials are 
absolutely immune from suit for its decision relating to the parole 
of defendant Menzies in this case. 
WHEREFORE: Summary Judgment is entered in favor of all State 
Defendants on all claims brought by plaintiff in this matter based 
upon the reasons stated in the defendants' memoranda in support of 
their motion for summary judgment and the reasons stated in the 
Court's signed minute^entry of April 5, 1991. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this ~day of 6iS*** , 1991, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, an exact copy of AMENDED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO STATE DEFENDANTS to: 
P. Gary Ferrero 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Michael A. Neider 
Lloyd C. Eldredge 
Neider & Ward 
P.O. Box 57005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Ralph L. Menzies 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 ZP. 
Frank D. Mylar 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTACHMENT D 
ATTACHMENT "D" 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ; 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
I ORDER FOR ENTRY OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
> Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Court, in the above entitled matter, having 
reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein and having 
expressly determined, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay, 
does hereby: 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE 
That all previous orders of the Court having 
dismissed claims or having granted Summary Judgment are final 
MAY 2 9 1991 
Orders and Final Judgment is hereby entered thereon 
DATED th 1. 2? 
-fc-
day of May, 1991 
BY THE £OURJ: 
/> 
ON<JRABL£ fcO^ARD H. MOFFAT 
udge , / h i A y D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
h ORAB 
J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order for Entry of 
Final Judgment , this 2*1 day of May, 1991, to the 
following: 
Frank Mylar 
Assistant Attorney General 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
6100 S. 300 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Gary L. Johnson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-a-Mat 
P.O. Box 2465 





P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ] 
Defendants. 
I EX PARTE ORDER EXTENDING 
TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF 
I APPEAL 
I Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above entitled Court having reviewed Plaintiffs' 
Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time, the pleadings and papers on 
file herein, having been fully advised in the premises, and 
for good cause shown does hereby, 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE: 
That Plaintiffs' time to file a Notice of Appeal in 
i ti*tr.\ Jv..-5%v 
M 2 7 I99J 
-kl-LL^ji'f'^d _._ n: 
the above entitled matter is extended by thirty (30) days, 
DATED this ^// day of June, 1991. 
fudge, ^irAy))istrict Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Order, 
this *A f day of June, 1991, to Frank Mylar, 
Assistant Attorney General and R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney 
General, Attorneys for Defendants, 6100 S. 300 E.f Salt Lake 
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P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ] 
Defendants. 
I NOTICE OF APPEAL 
> Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
TO THE ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
You and each of you will take notice that Plaintiffs, 
in the above entitled matter, hereby appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), from the Order of Dismissal, entered the / day of 
February, 1988, dismissing Plaintiffs' claim against the 
Defendant Gas-A-Mat Oil Corporation of Colorado and from the 
Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment to the State 
Defendants entered May 15, 1991, granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of all remaining defendants, except for Defendant Ralph 
LeRoy Menzies, issued by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. These orders were certified as Final Judgments 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
an Order entered on the 29th day of May, 1991. 
DATED this A $~ day of July, 1991. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, 
this JX& day of July, 1991, to the following: 
Frank Mylar 
Assistant Attorney General 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
6100 S. 300 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Gary L. Johnson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-a-Mat 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
• *^/yyp 
Ime hunsaker.noa 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
433 South 400 East 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
LLOYD C. ELDREDGE #3927 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
7050 South Union Park Avenue 
Suite 420 
P.O. Box 57005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0005 
Telephone: (801) 566-3688 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
JIM HUNSAKER, individually 
and on behalf of the deceased 
MAURINE HUNSAKER, and BETTY 
SUDWEEKS on behalf of MATT 
HUNSAKER, NICHOLAS HUNSAKER, 
and DANA HUNSAKER, minor 




STATE OF UTAH, a body politic, 
GARY DELAND as director of the 
Utah State Department of 
Corrections, THE UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
AND PAROLE, MYRON MARCH as the 
director of the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole, RAY WALL, as the 
Regional Supervisor, Region 
III of Utah State Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole, 
KENT JONES and JOE SMOUT, as 
Supervisors of John Shepard 
of the Utah State Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole, 
DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Subject to Assignment to 
the Court of Appeals 
Appellate Court No. 
910366 
JOHN SHEPARD, in his capacity ) 
as parole officer, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION ) 
AND PAROLE, GAS-A-MAT OIL CORP 
OF COLORADO, a Colorado ) 
corporation and JOHN DOES I-V, 
) 
Defendants/Appellants. 
1. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM: 
The Order of Dismissal entered the 1st day of February, 1988 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendant Gas-A-Mat 
Oil Corporation of Colorado and the Amended Order granting 
Summary Judgment to the State Defendants entered May 15, 1991. 
2. NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED: 
Motion to enlarge time in which to file Notice of Appeal dated 
June 27, 1991 and Order granting additional thirty (30) days in 
which to file Notice of Appeal entered June 27, 1991. 
3. DATE OF ORDER OF DETERMINATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
UNDER UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 54(b): May 29, 1991. 
4. DATE OF FILING OF NOTICE OF APPEAL: July 26, 
1991. 
5. JURISDICTION: The Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. . Section 78-2-2(3) (j) . 
6. NAME OF TRIAL COURT OR AGENCY: The Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
7. STATEMENT OF FACTS: This is an action brought by 
the survivors of Maurine Hunsaker. Mrs. Hunsaker was kidnapped 
and murdered by Ralph LeRoy Menzies on or about February 24, 
1986. At the time of her abduction, Mrs. Hunsaker was employed 
by Gas-A-Mat at their station located at 3995 West 4700 South, 
Salt Lake County, Utah. The station was noted for previous 
robbery attempts and the management had posted signs indicating 
that there was electronic surveyance of the area. Mrs. Hunsaker 
relied upon the assurance of surveyance as indicated by the 
signs and believe that the security had been provided for by her 
employer acting in a separate capacity. The Plaintiffs believe 
that the dual capacity doctrine as set forth by the Supreme 
Court has application in this situation and the facts support 
said application. Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678 (Utah 
1985). 
The Defendant Ralph L. Menzies was a convicted felon 
on parole, supervised, and in the custody of Adult Probation and 
Parole, Department of Corrections, State of Utah. During his 
supervised parole, Menzies committed not less than four (4) 
major parole violations, none of which were reported to the Utah 
State Board of Pardons. The failure to report parole violations 
was and is a violation of policy set forth by the Department of 
Corrections, Division of Adult Probation and Parole. 
The relationship between Menzies and AP & P created a 
duty of due care on the part of AP & P to regulate foreseeable 
conduct on the part of Ralph L. Menzies. Owens v. Garfield, 125 
Utah Adv. Rpt. 3 (1989). The State Defendants failed to take 
action that was required under that policy thereby breaching 
their duty of due care. Menzies had a long history of violent 
acts and the Department of Corrections was aware of this 
history. Based on the history, the parole violations and the 
3 
policy created by the Division of Corrections, a duty of due 
care to all members of the public in which it was foreseeable 
that Menzies could come in contact existed. Doe v. Arcruelles, 
716 P.2d 279 (Utah 1985) and Division of Corrections v. Neakok, 
721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986). By failing to report parole 
violations to the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Department 
breached that duty and the State of Utah, Department of 
Corrections, Division of Adult Probation and Parole are liable 
for that breach. 
8. ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
a. Defendant Gas-A-Mat Oil Corporation of 
Colorado: The Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Plaintiffs contend that the dual capacity doctrine advanced by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Bingham supports the position that an 
employer may act in a dual capacity. In reviewing a court's 
dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the standard 
of review is that the Appellate Court must review the case in 
the light most favorable to the party whose complaint was 
dismissed. Since there are no findings of fact, the Appellate 
Court may substitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court. 
See Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). 
b. State Defendants: The issue presented is 
what duty is created on the part of a state agency to members of 
the public in general. The Court has indicated that a duty may 
be created either by a special relationship between the State 
4 
and the victim or by a special relationship between the State 
and the third-party actor. The Plaintiffs assert that that 
third-party actor was being supervised by the State Defendants, 
thereby creating a duty to regulate foreseeable conduct against 
foreseeable (if not readily identifiable) Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' claims against the State were denied on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, therefore, the Court must review the facts in 
the light most favorable to the Plaintiff and determine if any 
material issues of fact exist. In that no findings of facts 
have been entered, the standard is that the Appellate Court may 
substitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court in that 
these are questions of law. See Ferree, supra. 
9. DETERMINATION OF CASE BY SUPREME COURT: This case 
involves primary and significant issues. In Bingham. the Utah 
Supreme Court opened the door for the dual capacity doctrine to 
be imposed upon employers. It is a significant issue and the 
extent of that opening should be finally resolved by the Utah 
Supreme Court and not by the Court of Appeals. 
Similarly in Ferree and Owens, the Utah Supreme Court 
dealt with the question of duty to the general public by a state 
defendant. In Ferree, the Court appeared to take away the 
liability of a state defendant to the public at large. However, 
in Owens the Court set forth two relationships which could 
create this duty. This particular opinion seems to be in 
conflict with the Ferree decision. These, taken together with 
the Court's decision in Doe, adds to the apparent conflict. 
5 
It is vitally important that the Utah Supreme Court 
determine, once and for all, based upon previous decisions, 
under what circumstances a duty to the general public exists so 
that the State could become liable for negligence on the part of 
its employees. 
10. DETERMINATIVE LAW: There are no determinative 
statutes, rules or cases in this situation. 




Attachment A - Order of Dismissal, dated February 1, 
1988; 
Attachment B - Minute Entry granting Summary 
Judgment, dated April 5, 1991; 
Attachment C - Amended Order granting Summary 
Judgment, dated May 15, 1991; 
Attachment D - Order for Entry of Final Judgment, 
dated May 29, 1991; 
Attachment E - Order Enlarging Time to File Notice 
of Appeal, dated June 27, 1991; and 
Attachment F - Notice of Appeal, dated July 26, 
1991. 
DATED this /£ day of August, 1991. 
6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Docketing Statement, postage prepaid, this 
I (, day of August, 1991, to the following: 
Frank Mylar 
Assistant Attorney General 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
6100 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Gary L. Riuhaj_djjr-/^ Cv^ ^^ v 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-A-Mat 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Id hunsstat.doc 
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Salt Lake Coti**- * t?at\ 
FEB1 1988 
H. Dixon Hincliey, 
By £ 
GARY L. JOHNSON 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-A-Mat 
Oil Corporation of Colorado 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 24 65 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, individually and 
on behalf of the deceased 
MAURINE HUNSAKER, and BETTY 
SUDWEEKS on behalf of MATT 
HUNSAKER, NICHOLAS HUNSAKER, 
and DANA HUNSAKER, minor 




STATE OF UTAH, a body politic, 
GARY DELAND as director of the 
Utah State Department of 
Corrections, THE UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, THE 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
AND PAROLE, MYRON MARCH as the 
director of the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole, RAY WALL, as the 
Regional Supervisor, Region III 
of Utah State Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole, 
KENT JONES and JOE SMOUT, as 
Supervisors of John Shepard 
of the Utah State Department 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. C87-4084 
Judge Richard Moffat 
ot Adult: Probation and Paroie, j 
JOHN SHEPARD, in his capacity 
as parole officer, UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT PROBATION 
AND PAROLE, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
GAS-A-MAT OIL CORP. OF COLORADO, 
a Colorado corporation and JOHN 
DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss having 
become regularly before the Court on its law and motion 
calendar; and plaintiff's being represented by P. Gary 
Ferrero and Richard C. Hutchison; and defendant Gas-A-Mat 
being represented by Gary L. Johnson, Richard, Brandt, Miller & 
Nelson, and the Court having reviewed the memoranda of both 
parties and the legal authorities cited herein, and the Court 
having heard oral argument, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant 
Gas-A-Mat's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the merits and 
with prejudice. 
DATED this ^ Z _ ^ day of [^Sl/yLLtdA+1 ^~^i 1988. 
BY THE( 











I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage n
prepaid on this jT^^day of <^h^&u4 , 1988, to the 




P. Gary Ferrero 
Suite 570 
7050 South Union Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 7005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Richard C. Hutchison 
NEIDER & HUTCHISON 
Suite 570 
7050 South Union Park Avenue 
P.O. Box 7005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Stuart W. Hinckley 
Brent A. Burnett 
Capitol Bldg., Suite 236 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Attorney for Defendant 
State of Utah 
<z?Q.L A4rTt .r\ 
ATTACHMENT nBr 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 870904084 PI 
vs. : 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
The Court having heard oral argument on and having 
considered the various memorandum in support of and in 
opposition to the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
now being fully advised in the premises makes and enters this 
its: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
The Court is aware of the position of the plaintiffs to 
the effect that there is no duty of care running to the decedent 
from the defendants other than if a special relationship exists 
which give rise to that duty. The "special circumstances" as 
alleged in this case is based on two factors urged by the 
plaintiff. First the duty arises because the decedent Maurine 
Hunsaker was in a "special relationship" by reason of working 
HUNSAKER V STATE PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
with the public. The plaintiff contends that the most recent 
violent act prior to his parole by Ralph Menzies was the 
aggravated robbery and shooting of a taxi driver. He further 
contends that the plaintiff's probation officer knew of the 
violent propensities of Ralph Menzies and knew of the shooting 
of the taxi driver. That knowledge is then coupled with the 
fact that the probation officer failed to report all parole 
violations to the Board of Pardons thus violating internal 
procedures established by the Board of Pardons. The parole 
violations were not the commission of other violent crimes but 
rather the violation of some remedial terms of parole. Thus the 
plaintiff's position is that the decedent Maurine Hunsaker was 
in a "special relationship11 to the defendants and in addition 
that by reason of violation of the parole boards internal 
reporting procedures and thus its standards the duty to the 
decendent was breached by the defendants. The Court has some 
substantial difficulty with this analysis. It seems to the 
undersigned that the rather arbitrary classification of "persons 
who work with the public" is simply not a sufficient definition 
of a certain person or class of persons to be protected by their 
"special circumstances". The fact of the matter is almost 
everybody in service industries can be regarded as working with 
the public and that can run from professors and teachers in 
colleges and high schools to service station attendants, to bank 
mOSSXKER V STATE PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
tellers, to court employees, to judges, to car hops at drive inns 
(there are still two in the State of Utah) to police officers, 
cab drivers and a whole myriad of persons• That classification 
becomes so general that I believe it becomes self defeating and 
cannot possibly qualify for the "special relation or special 
circumstances11 definition as set forth in the various applicable 
Utah cases. 
Additionally the Court is not convinced that the failure 
to report all parole violations to the Board of Pardons would be 
regarded as a violation of the duty even if one existed in favor 
of the decedent. There is no evidence that the parole board 
would have changed the parole conditions of Mr. Menzies nor 
revoked it nor in any other way take any action which would have 
afforded greater protection to either a reasonable classification 
of persons in which Maurine Hunsaker fell or to Mrs. Hunsaker 
herself. Thus it is the Courts opinion that the State in this 
case did not have a duty to protect Mrs. Hunsaker in any manner 
above and different from the duty of protection to the general 
public which general duty is not even alleged to have been 
breached and therefore the Motion for Summary Judgment should be 
granted. In addition there is no clear showing that the 
violation complained of would have in any way effected the 
parole status of the perpetrator and thus changed the tragic 
outcome of this set of circumstances. For these reasons, inter 
alia, and the ones set forth in the defendants' Memorandum in 
HUNSAKER V STATE PAGE 4 MINUTE ENTRY 
Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary Judgment is 
granted. Counsel for the defendants will prepare an appropriate 
order and summary judgment. 
DATED this day of April, 
HUNSAKER V STATE PAGE 5 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING 
I hereby certify that I 
the foregoing Minute Entry, 
this ^t—- day of April, 1991 
Michael A. Neider 
Lloyd C. Eldredge 
NEIDER & WARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
P. 0. Box 57005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
P. Gary Ferrero 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
P. 0. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Mariane Baldwin 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 403 
Salt Cake City, Utah 84107 
CERTIFICATE 
mailed a true and correct copy of 
postage prepaid, to the following, 
ATTACHMENT "C" 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
FRANK MYLAR (5116) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
801-265-5638 
MAY 1 5 1991 
SALT LAKH UJv^iTY 
By —£ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 




STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
STATE DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 870904084 PI 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
THE COURT having considered Defendants State of Utah, Gary 
Deland, Utah State Department of Corrections, Utah Board of 
Pardons, Myron March, Ray Wahl, Kent Jones, Joe Smout, John 
Shepard, and Utah State Adult Probation & Parole's (hereafter 
"State Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment, together with all 
documents and memoranda filed in support of defendants motion and 
all memoranda and documents filed by plaintiff's objecting to 
defendants' motion and further having heard oral argument of 
counsel and having found no geniue issues of material fact, and 
good cause appearing, the Court now makes the following ruling: 
1. Neither the State of Utah nor its entities and officials 
owed a legal duty to the plaintiff with respect to defendant 
Menzies' alleged murder of Maurine Hunsaker. 
2. The State defendants are immune from suit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 
3. The Utah Board of Pardons and its officials are 
absolutely immune from suit for its decision relating to the parole 
of defendant Menzies in this case, 
WHEREFORE: Summary Judgment is entered in favor of all State 
Defendants on all claims brought by plaintiff in this matter based 
upon the reasons stated in the defendants' memoranda in support of 
their motion for summary judgment and the reasons stated in the 
Court's signed minute^entry of April 5, 1991. 
DATED this jBpflay of /^a*L^\W'L>  yfyd*Lr~Ffii 
Richard/HZTMof f a t 
THIRD J3I3PRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this 0 3 — day of _ 4 * ^ _ , 1991, I mailed, 
postage prepaid, an exact copy of AMENDED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO STATE DEFENDANTS to: 
P. Gary Ferrero 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Michael A. Neider 
Lloyd C. Eldredge 
Neider & Ward 
P.O. Box 57005 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Ralph L. Menzies 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 ez? 
Frank D. Mylar 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ATTACHMENT "D" 
MAY 2 9 1991 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNT<, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al . , 
Defendants. 
I ORDER FOR ENTRY OF 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The Court, in the above entitled matter, having 
reviewed the pleadings and papers on file herein and having 
expressly determined, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, that there is no just reason for delay, 
does hereby: 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE 
That all previous orders of the Court having 
dismissed claims or having granted Summary Judgment are final 
Orders and Final Judgment is hereoy entered thereon 
DATED this May, 1991. 
BY THEXOUSJ: 
HONOfUBL^ R'^.ARD H. MOFFAT 
Judge, / h i / r f / D i s t r i c t C o u r t 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order for Entry of 
Final Judgment , this ^f day of May, 1991, to the 
following: 
Frank Mylar 
Assistant Attorney General 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
6100 S. 300 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Gary L. Johnson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-a-Mat 
P.O. Box 2465 




P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (301) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ] 
Defendants. 
I EX PARTE ORDER EXTENDING 
TIME TO FILE NOTICE OF 
I APPEAL 
) Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above entitled Court having reviewed Plaintiffs' 
Ex Parte Motion to Extend Time, the pleadings and papers on 
file herein, having been fully advised in the premises, and 
for good cause shown does hereby, 
ORDER, ADJUDGE and DECREE: 
That Plaintiffs' time to file a Notice of Appeal in 
the above entitled matter is extended by thirty (30) days. 
DATED this ^c / day of June, 1991. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ex Parte Order, 
this J^ f day of June, 1991, to Frank Mylar, 
Assistant Attorney General and R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney 
General, Attorneys for Defendants, 6100 S. 300 E. , Salt Lake 
City, UT 84107. 
Ime hunsaker.eop 
ATTACHMENT " F " 
THIRD . ,TRICT 
SAL ,|TY 
P. GARY FERRERO #1066 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
433 S. 400 E. 
P.O. Box 572476 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-2476 
Telephone: (801) 261-0265 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JIM HUNSAKER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ; 
STATE OF UTAH, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 Civil No. 870904084PI 
) Judge Richard H. Moffat 
TO THE ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
You and each of you will take notice that Plaintiffs, 
in the above entitled matter, hereby appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 78-2-
2(3)(j), from the Order of Dismissal, entered the / day of 
February, 1988, dismissing Plaintiffs' claim against the 
Defendant Gas-A-Mat Oil Corporation of Colorado and from the 
Amended Order Granting Summary Judgment to the State 
Defendants entered May 15, 1991, granting Summary Judgment in 
favor of all remaining defendants, except for Defendant Ralph 
LeRoy Menzies, issued by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat. 
Judge, Thi^d Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. These orders were certified as Final Judgments 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by 
an Order entered on the 29th day of May, 1991. 
DATED this £$~ day of July, 1991. 
£4. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal, 
this JX<n day of July, 1991, to the following: 
Frank Mylar 
Assistant Attorney General 
R. Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General for the State of Utah 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
6100 S. 300 E. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Gary L. Johnson 
Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant Gas-a-Mat 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
T m a k \ i m c Q t / o > " K-W 
